Assuming @5db24d2f…12d97fa2 designed as advertised, of the 2-of-3 keys needed, Bitkey servers controls 1 key, the mobile app controls 1 key, and the hardware device itself controls 1 key. There is also an encrypted backup of the mobile app key stored in your cloud account - which requires the hardware device to decrypt it. In short, in addition to the key from Bitkey severs, the FBI would also need either your hardware device, or the key from your mobile app (which I suppose could potentially be lifted through some sort of spyware and/or malicious version of the app). *The key controlled by the hardware device isn't backed up anywhere (it's designed to not even be possiible). If the device is lost (or just stops working for whatever reason), the user's only recourse is to hope to still be able to get a new device and hope to still be able to coordinate with Bitkey to transfer funds (via the mobile app key and the Bitkey servers key) to an entirely new 2-of-3 keyset.

Apply says they don’t have the key

PS... Apparently, your recovery contact(s) would also have what's necessary to decrypt your app key stored in the cloud... so, potentially, if FBI compromises Bitkey server, your cloud provider, and also somehow a recovery contact, I suppose your wallet could be at risk without you necessarily ever even knowing it.

Yeah, that's what I was trying to say with "coordinate with Bitkey to transfer funds (via the mobile app key and the Bitkey servers key) to an entirely new 2-of-3 keyset"

To confiscate the gov needs access to your phone, unlock code of phone and a warrant for Bitkey. Or somehow trick you in using the hardware with your finger print.

🙈

No, the cloud key IS encrypted with the bitkey device... but as long as you still have the unencrypted version of that key on your phone (in the app), you don't even have to bother with decrypting the cloud key in order to coordinate with bitkey to setup a new device (and new 2-of-3 keyset). The only purpose for the cloud key is in case you lose your phone (or delete the app), you can decrypt the key stored in your cloud (using your bitkey device) for use on a new phone. *there are also encrypted version(s) of your app key stored in YOUR cloud that your recovery contact(s) hold the decryption key for. In case you lose both your phone AND your bitkey device, installing a fresh app on a new phone will allow you to use the decryption key held by a recovery contact to recover your app key from YOUR cloud - which in turn can be used to coordinate with bitkey to setup a new device (and new 2-of-3 keyset). Of course, the app on your phone combined with the app on your recovery contact's phone handle the coordination of all this to make it reasonably painless. (minus the waiting period you mentioned earlier). Again, assuming designed as advertised (which I think is fair to question), I think it's pretty clever. My biggest problem with bitkey is that they advertise it as "self-custody"; but unlike virtually any other hardware wallet, if you lose the bitkey device, because it's designed to have nothing to backup (e.g. a seed phrase), self-recovery is not possible. In my book, reliance on a 3rd-party for recovery necessarily disqualifies it as self-custody.

... and no, personally, I would not feel secure having my life savings in something I don't consider to be self-custody (i.e. including self-recovery).